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)UHHGRPRIPRYHPHQW:K\LWLVFHQWUDOWR6FRWODQG¶V
interests in the Brexit negotiations 
Colin Imrie, Independent Policy Analyst 
 
Introduction 
7KH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQfollowing the UK vote to leave the EU in June 2016, to introduce 
controls on the ability of EU nationals to live and work in the UK, is expected to be a central point of 
dispute in the framing of a new trading relationship between the EU and the UK.  The reason for this is 
that freedom of movement of people is one of the four founding principles of the EU and is integral to 
the single market.  It is not an add-on which can be traded away against other trade principles or 
pressures1.  Within the UK this has particular consequences for Scotland, which has used freedom of 
movement to make significant economic gains in recent years. 
 
Economic rationale for freedom of movement 
There are both economic and legal underpinnings to freedom of movement.  In economic terms2, the 
factors of production should be mobile across a single market.  When firms are better able to compete 
and capital can flow freely to where it is most efficiently used, people need to be able to move to where 
the jobs are.  In a Europe where languages and cultures vary greatly, moving to another country can 
pose significant challenges, but once a person has decided to move, legal and administrative measures 
should facilitate rather than obstruct such movement.  The South-to-North flow of people remains limited 
in the 21st century (it was much more pronounced in the early days of the EU, although it is important 
to note that there has been a significant move of e.g. Spanish nationals to Scotland following the 2008 
recession3).  But there is a more pronounced East-to-West flow whereby citizens of the newer member 
states which joined in 2004 and 2007 move to the older member states.  Following the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements, Ireland has received the highest share (2%) of foreign EU citizens as a share of the 
working-age population.  Most EU citizens living in another EU country complement the native workforce 
by finding jobs in sectors where there is excess labour demand.  The impact on public finances overall 
is positive, since the average EU ³PRYHU´WHQGVWREH of working age and in employment, compared to 
the average native.  EU ³movers´ are, however, over-represented in low-wage sectors and therefore on 
average earn lower wages than natives, despite often being over-qualified.  The possibility to move 
abroad has helped to ease high unemployment rates in some of the new member states.  This is helpful 
                                                          
1
 A very good summary of the overall importance of free movement to EU agreements with third countries can be found in the 
DUWLFOHE\6WHIDQR0LFRVVLRI&(36LQ1RYHPEHU³6RIW%UH[LWLVQRWDQRSWLRQ´
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/%E2%80%98soft-brexit%E2%80%99-not-   
2
 There are many good sources for the economic rationale for freedom of movement ± The Fact Sheet on the Single Market 
prepared in early 2015 by the Swedish Board of Trade contains a very useful literature review  
http://www.kommers.se/Documents/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2015/Publ-single-market-4-freedoms-16-facts.pdf  
3
 http://cosmopolitascotland.org/la-emigracion-espanola-en-edimburgo-el-reto-de-la-integracion-cultural/  
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in the short term but may lead to a problem in the long term if the most motivated and qualified workers 
stay abroad for long.  It is for this reason that a crucial flanking policy of the single market is financial 
transfers to the poorer countries, primarily through cohesion policy and now increasingly through 
investment vehicles such as the Juncker Investment Plan, in order to allow them to invest in skills and 
jobs for the future.  
Legal underpinning4 
The right of free movement is enjoyed by all nationals of countries which participate in the single market, 
i.e. all EU Member States, the European Economic Area (EEA) states and Switzerland.  All nationals 
of EU Member States are also European Citizens5 possessing the rights of free movement and 
residence in the EU.  'LUHFWLYH(&NQRZQDVWKHµ&LWL]HQ¶V5LJKWV'LUHFWLYH¶Rr µ)UHH0RYHPHQW
'LUHFWLYH¶SURYLGHV that all EU citizens (and EEA nationals) can enjoy free movement and residence 
unconditionally across the EEA for a period of up to 3 months.  To enjoy residence in another Member 
State beyond three months, the individual must be a national of a Member State (nationality is a matter 
for MHPEHU6WDWH¶VRZQODZDQGbe either a worker, a self-employed person,  an economically self-
sufficient person with health insurance cover such as retired people or  a student with health insurance 
cover and sufficient resources to support themselves, or a jobseeker who has a genuine chance of 
being engaged (with some limits to equal treatment in terms of access to social assistance until they 
become employed).  
7R HQVXUH WKDW LW ZRXOG QRW EH WR D SHUVRQ¶V GLVDGYDQWDJH WR exercise the right to work in another 
Member State, Regulation (EC) 883/2004 coordinates social security across the EU.  This coordination 
of social security preserves the right of the Member States to determine the types of benefits and the 
rules governing them.  It also ensures that payments into one national system are acknowledged and 
that different national systems are coordinated, thus protecting social security entitlements as if they 
had been accrued in the same Member State for the course of a citi]HQ¶VZRUNLQJOLIH.  The right of free 
movement includes the right to be accompanied by family and the right to equal treatment or the 
freedom from discrimination on the grounds of nationality.  This means that EU citizens and their family 
members living in another Member State enjoy the same treatment as nationals of the host Member 
State.  This encompasses a range of circumstances including employment and recruitment, conditions 
of employment and social assistance and tax advantages.  This is limited, in the case of access to social 
security, with regard to the need to protect public finances, and EU citizens and their family must not 
EHFRPHDµEXUGHQ¶RQWKHVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHV\VWHPRIWKHKRVW0HPEHU6WDWH.  Recently the case law 
of the CJEU has determined that workers may have access to social assistance on the basis of equal 
treatment but EU citizens who are not economically active may not6.  
                                                          
4
      A very useful summary of the legal background to freedom of movement can be found in the contribution on Free 
Movement, Immigration and Political Rights prepared by the Scottish University Legal Network on Europe, lead authors Nina 
Miller Westerby and Professor Jo Shaw     https://sulne.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/free-movement-immigration-and-political-
rights-sulne-roundtable-oct-2016-4.pdf  
5
 Treaty of Maastricht http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:xy0026&from=EN  
6
 C-333/13 Dano v Job Centre Leipzig, 11 November 2014 
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An important right for EU citizens and their family members is the right to permanent residence in any 
other EU country.  The status of permanent residence follows five years of lawful residence in the host 
Member State.  This means that the EU citizen or family member who achieves permanent residence 
is integrated fully as a member of the host Member State.  They benefit from continued protection under 
the equal treatment principle and from enhanced procedural safeguards against expulsion.  An EU 
citizen with permanent residence status cannot lose these rights or the right of residence if his or her 
economic status changes.  Finally EU citizens also have political rights to vote and stand in local and 
European Parliamentary elections.  So far the UK remains an outlier in  extending these rights to 
regional (devolved) assemblies and Parliaments, which of course led to EU citizens registered to vote 
in Scotland in Scottish elections having the right to vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum in 
2014 (but not of course, under the UK parliamentary franchise, in the 2016 EU referendum.) 
UK debate in and following the EU referendum 
During the UK referendum campaign the Leave Side focused increasingly on immigration as the key 
reason for ³taking back control´ from the EU.  The content of the Leave campaign tended to muddle up 
issues such as the current migration crisis into Europe from the Middle East and Africa and the effect it 
might have in the UK with the rights of EU nationals to exercise their freedom of movement.  The ability 
of the Remain side to respond was limited by the failure of the Downing Street-led campaign to broaden 
the case to Remain from a purely economic prospectus7 and to endorse direct attacks on Conservative 
³/eave´ spokesmen.  /DERXU¶V DSSURDFK WR IUHHGRP RI PRYHPHQW UHPDLQHG UHODWLYHO\ IOXLG ZLWK
concerns about migration coming across strongly on the doorstep, especially in the North of England, 
and some trade unionists arguing for restrictions to be placed on EU nationals to protect the rights and 
wages of low-paid UK workers.  The way the referendum result was interpreted by the main UK parties, 
and by Theresa May on assuming Conservative leadership, made it clear that there was a strong belief 
that voters were demanding controls on EU migration into the UK.  In her address to the Conservative 
Party Conference on 5 October 2015 the Prime Minister made it clear that she would include controls 
RQ(8IUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQWLQKHUSURSRVDOVXQGHU$UWLFOHDORQJZLWKSDUDOOHOPHDVXUHVWR³WDNH
EDFNFRQWURO´ LQFOXGLQJUHLQVWDWLQJ WKHVRYHUHLJQW\RI%ULWLVKFRXUWV.  The position in Labour remains 
inconsistent.  On the one hand, Jeremy Corbyn and the leadership remain attached to freedom of 
movement8, but key Labour figures such as Yvette Cooper, chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee, 
Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones and Manchester Mayoral candidate Andy Burnham, backed up by 
Len McLuskey of UNITE, DUHOHDGLQJZRUNZLWKLQWKHSDUW\WRFUHDWHD³SURJUHVVLYH´case for restrictions 
on freedom of movement.  ,QSOHGJLQJ/DERXU¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V triggering of Article 50 
(subject to a plan being prepared and presented to Parliament), Labour Brexit spokesman Keir Starmer 
PDGHLWFOHDUWKDW/DERXU¶VNH\VLQJOHPDUNHWREMHFWLYHZDVWDULIIIUHHDFFHVV to the single market ± a 
                                                          
7
 http://www.politico.eu/article/how-david-cameron-lost-brexit-eu-referendum-prime-minister-campaign-remain-boris-craig-
oliver-jim-messina-obama/ 
8
 December news articles showing the split in the UK Labour Party 
 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/28/jeremy-corbyn-you-are-not-henry-viii-theresa-may-brexit-deal-commons-
vote?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/16/len-mccluskey-unite-workers-do-best-when-labour-supply-is-controlled  
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long way short of guaranteeing the four freedoms and associated social, cohesion and environmental 
legislation and policy. 
Scottish Debate on Freedom of Movement 
In Scotland the referendum debate was less focused on immigration than was the case in England and 
Wales.  There was a significant spill-over to Scotland of media coverage of the UK debate on 
immigration, but the Leave campaign in Scotland put more emphasis on a principled case against the 
EU as an institution, often from a left-wing perspective and focusing on key controversial policies such 
as the alleged advantages to Scotland of leaving the Common Fisheries Policy.  Scottish leaders of the 
Remain campaign made impassioned pleas in favour of freedom of movement and the role of EU 
citizens in Scotland, with little of the counter arguments which were virulent in the UK debate and media 
coverage.  The STUC generally took a position of explaining the benefits of social rights in Europe9 and 
noted that problems in low paid industries could be best dealt with by effective implementation of EU 
and UK employment and minimum wage legislation.  Following the referendum First Minister Nicola 
Sturgeon made guaranteeing the position of EU nationals in Scotland a key plank of her campaign to 
keep Scotland as close as possible to Europe to respect the 62% Scottish vote to remain in the EU. 
There are serious questions to be asked about whether this difference in the political debate accurately 
reflects public attitudes on migration in Scotland compared with other parts of the UK.  In his 
commentary on British Social Attitudes 2014 Professor John Curtice noted that the difference tended 
to be a matter of a few percentage points and that on most immigration issues Scottish attitudes tend 
to mirror UK views as a whole, with the largest category (43% compared with 52% in England) in favour 
of more restrictions10.  These public attitudes have not in recent years, however had a significant 
influence on the political debate in Scotland, which remains firmly in favour of more migration.  A good 
account of the reason for this can be found in the Holyrood interview with former First Minister Jack 
McConnell shortly after the EU referendum11.  In this he noted the importance of the Fresh Talent 
scheme he had launched with wide political and media support in 2005 in response to population 
decline, with a key role to attract and retain skilled graduates.  He said that his own, and other party 
OHDGHU¶VPHVVDJLQJRQWKHEHQHILWVRIGLYHUVLW\KDGEHHQPXFKPRUHSRsitive than in the rest of the UK, 
which had had significant impacts on the nature of the public debate in Scotland on matters such as 
asylum seekers.  He expressed the view that most politicians of both centre-right and centre-left parties 
across Europe aUHSD\LQJWKHSULFHIRU³ZDONLQJDZD\´IURPPDNLQJWKHGLIILFXOWGHFLVLRQV on migration 
issues. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.stuc.org.uk/eu-referendum  
10
 summarised in http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/11242539/Scotland-and-England-How-
different-are-they-really.htmls  
11
 https://www.holyrood.com/articles/inside-politics/jack-mcconnell-diversity-must-be-celebrated-not-tolerated-post-brexit  
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Scottish Government proposals 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOV³6FRWODQG¶V3ODFHLQ(XURSH´12 published on 20 December, set 
out the importance of continued European Single Market membership for Scotland.  They start from the premise 
this is the best outcome for the UK as a whole, but then explain WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWUDWHJ\IRUHQVXULQJ
Scotland can remain a member of the European Single Market even if the UK Government chooses a different 
outcome.  Such a differentiated outcome would require new powers which should come to Scotland.  If the UK 
decides not to apply freedom of movement on the current model, the Scottish Government argues that 
immigration powers should be devolved to Scotland to allow Scotland to operate a full single market 
model on the lines of an EEA member.  Free movement within the UK would continue to be facilitated 
by the Common Travel Area (CTA), with UK citizens continuing to have the right to live and work in any 
part of the UK.  People living in Scotland would have the right to free movement across the EU, while 
people in other parts of the UK would not.  The prospect of people from other European countries with 
the right to live and work in Scotland seeking to use Scotland as an access route to living and working 
in the rest of the UK would be tackled by immigration rules applied in the rest of UK, similar to the 
system that applies in countries such as Canada and Australia13.  Commentators have noted that given 
the increasing UK focus of control of migration at points of employment that this approach can be made 
to work if the political will is there.14  
There will be close scrutiny of these proposals at UK level.  At present it seems that the hard line on 
immigration taken by the Prime Minister when Home Secretary and in particular concerns about abuse 
will tend to lead UK decision-makers to resist devolving migration powers to Scotland.  In doing so, the 
UK Government should consider how restrictions on EU freedom of movement could impact 
significantl\RQ6FRWODQG¶VSXEOLFVHUYLFHV and wider economy.  In economic terms it is anticipated that 
any controls (especially in a highly discretionary system such as the UK immigration system) will result 
in reductions of migration and overall loss to the economy due to the administrative cost involved in 
applying these controls.  
EU Nationals and the Scottish Economy 
The first consideration is the importance of EU nationals to key sectors of the Scottish economy.  EU 
migrants form some 30% of employees in sectors such as food and drink, digital industries and 
hospitality, play a key role in health and social care and are an important source of highly-skilled labour 
for industries such as energy - they played a key role in enabling high growth in the sector when oil 
prices were high in 2009-14.  The advantage of EU labour is its ability to move quickly without the 
requirement for the heavy bureaucratic processes involved in getting a visa.  It will be possible to some 
extent to substitute for this as domestic labour is trained up, a key priority for the Scottish Government 
± but it will act to reduce growth opportunities and limit productivity gains.  Removing free movement 
                                                          
12
 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/12/9234  
13
 See Anton Muscatelli in Daily Telegraph on 29 December   http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/29/scotland-has-brexit-
plan-can-keep-single-market-union/   
14See article in Herald by Professor Jo Shaw on 15 November 2016 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14905300.Jo_Shaw_/?ref=rss  
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IRU(8VWXGHQWVDQGUHVHDUFKHUVZLOOLPSDFWSDUWLFXODUO\VHYHUHO\RQ6FRWODQG¶VKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQVHFWRU
given the high number (16%) of academic staff from the EU.  Charging fees to EU students, which 
would be allowed once EU law no longer applies may bring in badly needed income, but this could be 
offset by the loss of access to EU research grants.  Scottish research bodies could also lose their 
leading role in many collaborative EU projects, and the benefits of student mobility and enhanced 
learning experiences gained through ERASMUS could diminish. 
(81DWLRQDOVDQG6FRWODQG¶VGHPRJUDSKLFFKDOOHQJH 
Second, freedom of movement is of crucial importance WR 6FRWODQG¶V GHPRJUDSKLF FKDOOHnges and 
future economic growth.  The Scottish Economic Strategy15 puts a strong emphasis on growth in the 
working age population in underpinning sustainable economic growth.  Population growth increases the 
labour force and with it, the total amount the economy can produce and also increases demand for 
goods and services, creating business and employment opportunities.  The Government Economic 
Strategy (2007) included a target to match average European population growth over the period from 
2007 to 2017 and migration has a significant role to play in helping to ensure that this target and other 
performance indicators are met.  The accession of Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia to the EU in 2004 resulted in an increase in migration to Scotland, with 
particularly large in-migration from Poland.  The 2011 census showed a 4.6 % increase in the Scottish 
population, with a 225% increase in the number of EU-born nationals living in Scotland in 201116.  In 
economic growth terms this approach has paid dividends; between 2010 and 2035, the Scottish 
population is projected to increase by 10.2% above the EU average and significantly faster than many 
other European countries.  Within this, the working age population is also projected to increase.  Any 
UHVWULFWLRQVRQVXFKPLJUDWLRQZLOOLPSDFWRQ6FRWODQG¶VDELOLW\WRJURZLWVZRUNIRUFHDQGFRQVHTXHQWOy 
on economic growth, with the likelihood that the improvements shown in Scottish economic growth in 
the early years of the 21st century and in the provision of public services such as health and social care 
going into reverse. 
(8QDWLRQDOVDQG6FRWODQG¶Vfiscal challenge 
Third, any restrictions on freedom of movement could have major implications for future tax raising and 
inclusive growth objectives in Scotland.  The ³)LVFDO )ramework´, agreed after difficult negotiations 
between the UK and Scottish Governments in early 201617, sets out key rules on how the fiscal 
arrangements will operate, including such Barnett formula transfers as will continue after the Scottish 
Parliament implements the additional tax and social security powers transferred under the Scotland Act 
2016 on 30 November 2016.  In particular the question of how 6FRWODQG¶VUHODWLYHO\VORZHUSRSXODWLRQ
growth is dealt with was a point of dispute that was only solved by putting off the final decision until after 
                                                          
15
 http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0047/00472389.pdf 
16
 http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/scotland-census-profile/  
17
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-agreement-between-the-scottish-government-and-the-united-kingdom-
government-on-the-scottish-governments-fiscal-framework  
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the next major spending review in 202118.  7KH H[SHFWDWLRQ IROORZLQJ WKH &KDQFHOORU¶V $XWXPQ
Statement on 23 November19 that lower than expected tax take across the UK by the early 2020s will 
lead to increasing austerity in the 2021 review, can only increase the possibility that, if income tax take 
falls in Scotland due to a slowdown in population growth, then the risk of the UK failing to compensate 
in full the Scottish Parliament will grow, with FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VDPELWLRQV WR
deliver high quality public services and inclusive growth. 
Conclusion 
Freedom of movement is an integral part of the single market because it has a strong economic purpose 
and because it helps enforce rights available to EU citizens throughout the territory of the EU.  It is an 
essential FRPSRQHQWRIWKH(8¶VPRVWIDYRXUDEOHWUDGHGHDOVZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHVDQGDSSOLHVIXOO\WR
relationships with the European Economic Area and Switzerland.  While it seems that there is a strong 
consensus in England that a key consequence of the June 2016 referendum vote must be some 
restriction on freedom of movement of EU citizens, whatever the consequences this will have for the 
8.¶VIXWXUHWUDGLQJUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8QRVXFKFRQVHQVXVH[LVWVLQ6FRWODQGZKHUHWKHUHLVVWURQJ
political support for freedom of movement.  Freedom of movement has played an especially important 
role in Scotland in the 21st century in enabling the Scottish economy to grow faster than the historic 
trend, and there are real concerns that if restrictions are placed in future on freedom of movement of 
EU citizens this could impact on key sectors in the Scottish economy, reduce population growth and its 
associated impacts on economic growth, and have a major negative impact on the capacity of the 
Scottish Parliament to increase tax take under its new income tax powers. The Scottish Government 
have asked the UK to include special provisions to ensure Scotland can continue to apply Single Market 
Rules in its proposals to leave the EU under Article 50, but it remains to be seen what the UK will decide 
to do. 
                                                          
18
 A fuller account of the implications of the dispute over the model to be applied to budget transfers  - WKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V
approach to the &RPSDUDEOH0RGHO¶&0, based on a strict interpretation of the Barnett formula, and the Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUWKHIndexed Per Capita (IPC) model  can be found in the Institute for Fiscal Studies report   
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201605.pdf 
19
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-statement-2016-documents/autumn-statement-2016  
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute Occasional Paper 
 
About the author:  
 
Colin Imrie is an independent policy analyst.  He has worked on EU policy for the European 
Commission, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Scottish Government. 
 
Contact details: 
 
Colin Imrie 
e: colint.imrie@gmail.com 
tw: @colinimrieimrie 
 
International Public Policy Institute (IPPI) 
McCance Building, Room 4.26 
University of Strathclyde 
16 Richmond Street 
Glasgow G1 1XQ 
 
t: +44 (0) 141 548 3865 
e: ippi-info@strath.ac.uk  
tw: @StrathIPPI 
 
 
 
The International Public Policy Institute 
,33,LVWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI6WUDWKFO\GH¶VSULQFLSDOJDWHZD\WRSROLF\UHVHDUFKH[SHUWLVH,33,KDV
within it, several discrete policy centres: the Centre for Government and Public Sector Policy, 
the Centre for Health Policy, the Centre for Energy Policy, the Centre for Education and Social 
Policy and the Institute for Future Cities.  IPPI draws on expertise from across all four Faculties 
of the University ± Humanities and Social Sciences, Strathclyde Business School, Science and 
Engineering ± and from highly experienced practitioners who work with the Institute.  For more 
information, please see www.strath.ac.uk/research/internationalpublicpolicyinstitute  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the place of useful learning 
www.strath.ac.uk/research/internationalpublicpolicyinstitute 
ippi-info@strath.ac.uk  
University of Strathclyde Glasgow G1 1XQ 
 
 
The University of Strathclyde is a charitable body, 
registered in Scotland, with registration number SC015263 
